Cataclysm 737 Max: Business, Sensory and "Smart" Systems

Cataclysm 737 Max: Business, Sensory and “Smart” Systems

It is unacceptable that Boeing has so much authority over its own aircraft safety analysis, according to FAA experts at Boeing 737 Max, which reveal that the battle between the system and the pilot was cold. the popular Boeing 737 Max, who killed hundreds of people within five months, banned flights all over the world to fly this model.

Investigations are now being conducted, but the Seattle Times survey reveals that the equation that has led to these fatal situations involves strong business interests, technological delusions, and the overwhelming power of “smart” computer systems. In 2015, the Boeing and Airbus races are ruthless. The first is quickly confirming its new 737 Max.

FAA managers in the United States are forced to convey to the company the right to carry out air safety assessments themselves to enable the manufacturer to obtain approval beforehand. Therefore, no one notes that the initial safety analysis provided by Boeing to the FAA for the new Max-Analysis pollution control system used to certify the aircraft as safe to fly has several important shortcomings.

Non-Compliance for MCAS The new aircraft has a flight control system called MCAS (Maneuver Performance Improvement System). During a high-speed flight, the system should “understand” when the aircraft moves with too much nose, which can lead to delays, loss of control over the aircraft, coil and collision. In such situations the system can move the horizontal part of the tail (flap). It can “push” the nose of the plane.

This should restore smooth and smooth motion to the plane at a high speed. Unlike Boeing’s long tradition of giving the pilot full control over the aircraft, the new MCAS flight control system is designed to operate in the background without taking over the pilot’s command. That is, according to the company, it is necessary because much larger Max motors have to be set forward on the wing, altering the aerodynamic characteristics of the hull and lifting force.

In short, the system is designed for automatic activation only at extremely high speed, and the system is capable of “blowing” the nose of the plane. The analysis of this system has several details: – The power of a new flight control system designed to move the airplane bait to the nose suction point in order to prevent excessive movement slowdown is underestimated.

In aircraft management, the MCAS may move the queue more than four times, as highlighted in the original security analysis document; – the system is not considered to be reset whenever a pilot responds to his activity, leaving the potential impact on the aircraft due to the fact that the system repeatedly pushes the nose of the aircraft; – The fall of the system is evaluated for one level below the catastrophic level.

Described level is “dangerous”. But even at such a level, it should be possible for the system to rely on data from one sensor. However, this is the way it is designed. Business interests Several FAA experts – who have decided to remain anonymous before the Seattle Times – categorically stated that the Lion Air collision in October “is just the latest sign that the agency’s certification delegation has gone too far”.

They find it unacceptable that Boeing has so much authority over the security analysis of its aircraft. But why is that so? Due to the lack of financial resources and resources, FAA has over the years delegated Boeing’s increasing powers to take on more security certification tasks on its own aircraft.

At the beginning of the 737 Max Certification, the FAA Security Team shared technical assessments that would be delegated to Boeing from those considered critical by the agency – they should remain in the hands of the FAA. But some FAA technical experts have told the Seattle Times that during the certification managers, they are called to “speed up the process”. Max’s certificate was delayed nine months after the competitive Airbus A320neo.

Time is important to Boeing. Former FAA security engineer, who was directly involved in Max’s certification, says that at the center of the certification process, managers are asked to “reconsider what will be delegated”. The management believes the FAA has left too much work. “There was a constant pressure to re-examine our initial decisions,” says a former engineer who wanted to be anonymous.

“Even after they re-evaluated them … the administration continued to discuss delegating even greater responsibility to Boeing.” In this hustle and in the pressurized atmosphere, MCAS’s security analysis – just part of the mountain of documents required for certification – is delegated to Boeing. “Strange Position” When it announced a 737 Max suspension, the FAA has resembled Lion Air flight and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302.

The investigators also found evidence that parts of the Ethiopian airline’s aircraft engine were “in an unusual position” – the MCAS should be one of the possible reasons. Boeing’s original analysis submitted to the FAA includes a description of the MCAS, which sets a limit on how accurate the system can move the horizontal order. The limit is 0.6 degrees.

This limit was later increased after flight tests, indicating the need for a stronger queued mode to prevent slowdown at high speed, which would endanger the aircraft. After the Lion Air Flight 610, Boeing first submitted the MCAS aircraft data. Boeing newsletter for airline companies says the traffic limit that the system can do … 2.5 degrees! This figure is a novelty for FAA engineers.

Earlier they read that the 0.6 degree limit – in the security assessment. “The FAA believed the aircraft was designed to the 0.6 degree limit, which was also thought by foreign regulators,” says FAA engineer. “And that’s a big difference in the assessment of danger.” According to the engineers, if the FAA was informed in time for this adjustment, the approval process could not be passed. Many Power for a “Smart” System The limit problem is increasing for another element in system security analysis: the system has the right to adjust each time MCAS is started.

And it can be activated several times, as it was during the Lion Aira flight. The FAA security engineer says that every time Lion Air pilot restarts controls on its control posts to retract the nose, MCAS has reactivated and pushed the line with a “new step of 2.5 degrees.” MCAS restarted several times. Data from the black box reveals that the battle between the system and the pilot was cold.

The system moves and moves the tail plane, and the captain intervenes to adjust the position of the aircraft – this cycle is repeated 21 times! He then entrusted the management of the second pilot’s aircraft. After MCAS dropped the nose twice or three times, the other pilot responded with only two attempts to correct it. At the 2.5 degree limit, the plane is facing down.

The latest black box data show that the captain tried to continue controlling and speed up the aircraft – but too late. One Sensor A former Boeing engineer who worked on Max’s certification on behalf of the FAA told the Seattle Times that an aircraft management system would rely on one data source (one sensor) or two – depending on the security classification system that estimates what the happens if the system fails.

The rule is that every commercial aircraft, including various sensors, is sufficiently reliable to meet the “big collapse” requirement. This means that the probability of failure should be less than one in 100,000. Such systems usually have the right to rely on one incoming data sensor. However, when it is estimated that the potential consequences are more difficult and that the collapse would be “unsuccessful collapse,” the reliability requirement is likely to be less than one in 10 million.

In such cases, the system usually has at least two separate streams of input data – in case it is “confused”. Here is the role of Boeing’s security assessment, according to which the collapse of the MCAS would be dangerous but would not be “critical”. According to experts participating in the certification, the decision-making system is based on data from the sensor that measures the “angle of seizure” – the angle below which the counterpart meets the planes plane.

In fact, like all 737, Max has two sensors, one on each side of the hull, near the cockpit. But MCAS is designed to read data only from one of them. The data from the black box shown in the preliminary investigation report showed that the readings of the two sensors varied by about 20 degrees! The difference was a fact all the time on the fly, even when the plane was on the ground before taking off. Boeing could design a system for comparing data from both sensors.

So it would be clear that one of them was damaged. After the collision There are other factors that contributed to the deaths of two flights. Among them is the lack of training – pilots are not trained to handle the new MCAS system. Shortly after the Lion Aira crash, Max pilots around the world realize that there is such a system. Trainings are held, which – according to the pilot – last for not more than one hour per person and are made on a tablet.

In fact, pilots around the world are not aware of how to deal with MCAS in the event of a collapse. This allows a new system. Thanks to this, the aircraft gets a “standard” rating that allows pilots to board the aircraft without special training. It is assumed that, once more 737 succeed, they will be managed the same way.

Boeing now has a “software update” for Max. Additionally, MCAS should start reading data from both sensors for the angle of attack, and its strengths should be somewhat smaller. Alas, this improvement comes after several hundred lost lives.

Cataclysm 737 Max: Business, Sensory and “Smart” Systems